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Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Obligations in Small Business
Deana Nance and Joseph D. Vu
This paper discusses the issue of shareholder liabiHty for corporate obUgations 
in small business. Although the law allows individuals to incorporate their 
businesses to limit liabilities, the courts have in many cases pierced the corporate 
veil and held shareholders liable for obligations of the corporation. The doctrine 
of piercing the corporate veil rarely affects shareholders of publicly-traded firms. 
In most cases, this doctrine would only reach shareholders of small, closely held 
firms. While fraud or unjust intent provide reasons for the court to disregard 
corporate entity, oftentimes the honest but uninformed actions of shareholders 
are to blame. To maintain limited liability, shareholders of small businesses must 
act in accordance with die corporate form of ownership in representing the firm, 
managing the firm’s assets, and financing the firm.
I. INTRODUCTION
Limited liability is often cited as an advantage of the corporate form of 
business organization. The law allows individuals to incorporate their 
businesses to shield them in such a way that their maximum loss is limited 
to their capital contribution to the corporation. To take advantage of this 
legal provision, proprietors often decide to incorporate their businesses. 
However, the courts have in many cases pierced the “corporate veil” and held 
shareholders liable for obligations of the corporation. Typically, these 
situations only happen to small, closely-held corporations. Conrad [1] 
conducted a corporate census of American firms and found that the majority 
of corporations are small, whether measured by assets, revenues, or number 
of shareholders. Conrad estimated that 90% of American corporations have 
fewer than ten shareholders, and that 99% of all corporations have fewer than 
100 shareholders. These numbers suggest that the corporate finance literature 
should pay attention to the problems and important issues of small 
corporations. While fraud or unjust intent provide reasons for the court to 
disregard the corporate entity, oftentimes the honest but uninformed actions 
of shareholders are to blame. This paper will focus on the latter of these
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situations. To maintain limited liability, shareholders must act in accordance 
with the corporate form of ownership in representing the firm, managing 
the firm’s assets, and financing the firm.
II. CORPORATE REPRESENTATION
In sole proprietorships the distinction between business and personal 
activities is often blurred. Because the proprietor is liable for the obligations 
of the business and income from operation is taxable to the individual at 
personal income tax rates, there is little motivation to distinguish between 
personal and business activities. When the proprietorship is incorporated, 
the natural tendency is to continue to operate the corporation as a personal 
business, intertwining personal dealings with those of the new corporation. 
Treating the corporation as a personal business constitutes a disregard for 
the corporate entity by the shareholder and is likely to result in the court’s 
disregard for the corporate entity as well.
The courts have generally failed to protect shareholders from third-party 
claims when they chose to carry on their incorporated business as individuals 
or as partners. The shareholder may be found to be acting in his capacity 
as an individual proprietor or a member of a partnership rather than as an 
employee of the corporation if he does not represent himself to third parties 
as such. This applies to both oral and written communication. The 
shareholder who does not make clear to third parties that they are dealing 
with the corporation, rather than the shareholder individually may be 
endangering the corporate entity. Thus letterhead used in corporate 
communication should reflect the name of the corporation rather than the 
name of the shareholder or of the formerly unincorporated proprietorship. 
Separation of the individual from the corporation is also reflected in a distinct 
corporate address, telephone number, and checking account. Failure to 
maintain a separation between the personal business of the shareholder and 
the business of the corporation is likely to result in the court’s disregard for 
the corporate entity.
The shareholder who exercises complete domination and control of the 
corporation is likely to be found conducting business as an individual rather 
than as a corporation. If the shareholder consistently makes business 
decisions and conducts financial transactions without consulting other 
directors or officers, the corporation may be found to be merely an instrument 
through which the shareholder conducts his personal business affairs. Under 
the instrumentality rule, the shareholder is not protected by the corporate 
form and is liable for corporate obligations.
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Representing the business as a corporation also requires adhering to 
corporate formahties and recognizing corporate rules and duties as specified 
in the bylaws. Legal requirements of the state must be followed in the initial 
incorporation of the company including actually paying in the amount of 
paid-in capital specified in the Articles of Incorporation. Board meetings are 
to be held and attended and minutes from meetings kept on file. Corporate 
legal and accounting records are to be properly maintained and kept separate 
from those of any other business or individual.
While following corporate rules and formalities may in some ways 
restrict or lessen the autonomy of the shareholder/manager, it is nevertheless 
necessary if the corporate entity is to be preserved and the shareholder’s 
personal liability limited. One such corporate requirement, which is 
sometimes overlooked or neglected, is the issuance of stock. The failure to 
issue stock is often a contributing factor in the decision to disregard the 
corporate entity. While usually insufficient in itself, when accompanied by 
a lack of paid-in-capital, inadequate capitalization, incomplete organization, 
or individual domination, the failure to issue stock may result in piercing 
the corporate veil. However, this is one area in which state laws differ and 
in some jurisdictions there is no requirement that stock be issued before 
beginning corporate operations.
The rights and privileges of corporate ownership may be jeopardized 
if the corporation is not represented and run distinctly from other affiliated 
incorporated or unincorporated businesses. The shareholder who has ties to 
multiple businesses will not be shielded from liability if each corporation 
does not have its unique business purpose and is not operated separately from 
the others. Thus, in Mull v. Colt Cp. (1962, DC NY) 31 FRD154, stockholders 
were found to be doing business as individuals rather than as a corporation 
because incorporated businesses each owned two taxicabs, garaged them 
together, and were completely controlled by the parent corporation. This 
is an example of the court holding the shareholder liable for the obligations 
of a single business operation which is divided into multiple corporations 
solely for the purpose of shielding the shareholder or parts of the business 
from liability.
III. ASSET MANAGEMENT
Mismanagement of the firm’s tangible and financial assets may provide 
grounds for the court’s disregard of the corporate entity. The classic Jensen 
and Meckling [3] agency problem arises when the shareholder is also the 
manager of a partially debt-financed firm. Conflicts of interest exist between 
the shareholder/manager and the debtholders regarding investment.
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dividends and risk. Some of these conflicts may be more pronounced in the 
closely held corporation.
There is also the potential for underinvestment (See Myers, [4]). The 
shareholder/manager may reject a positive net present value if the resulting 
value of the firm would not be sufficient to cover the claims of the 
debtholders. Therefore, the project will be rejected even if it increases the 
value of the debt. The greater the debt outstanding, the greater is the potential 
for underinvestment.
The shareholder will also prefer greater dividends than the debtholders. 
In the closely held corporation, dividends are only one of the many forms 
that distributions to shareholders can take. As manager, the shareholder has 
the ability to transfer real or financial assets from the corporation to himself. 
Distributions from the corporation to the shareholder lessen the coverage 
of debt claims, thus the wealth of the shareholder increases at the expense 
of the debtholders.
One conflict which presents itself in publicly held corporations is less 
evident in the closely held firm. The shareholders in a publicly held firm 
prefer more risk than the debtholders because the shaireholders have a claim 
which is like an option on the value of the firm. However, the shareholder/ 
manager of the closely held corporation holds a poorly diversified portfolio 
and will, therefore, be more risk averse than the shareholder of a publicly 
held firm. He will, therefore, have incentive to purchase insurance, hedge, 
and undertake other risk reduction strategies which debtholders will find to 
be mutually beneficial. (See Nance, Smith, and Smithson, [5]).
Monitoring management may prevent or control wealth transfers. 
However, some of the traditional forms of monitoring are not available in 
the closely held corporation. For instance, the financial statements of the 
closely held firm do not have to be audited. The closely held corporation 
seldom uses bond financing, so bond radng agencies do not monitor the 
company. There is also less monitoring of the closely held firm because its 
stock is not publicly traded. The closely held firm is not required to make 
disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Because controls or restrictions under which the shareholder/manager 
operates may be fewer in the closely held corporation, there are fewer 
impediments to transferring wealth from the debtholder to the shareholder. 
While the job of the manager of a publicly held company may be threatened 
due to unacceptable performance, the shareholder/manager of the closely 
held firms likely to have complete job security regardless of his actions. While 
bond covenants may restrict the actions of the manager of the publicly held 
firm, it is more likely that any restrictions on the manager of the closely held 
firm will take the form of loan agreements with banks. Such agreements 
provide a degree of protection for the bank but the firm’s other creditors may
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Still suffer a loss in the value of their claims due to actions taken by the 
shareholder/manager.
The courts have recognized the conflicts which exist between the 
shareholder/manager and the corporation’s creditors and have in many cases 
disregarded the corporate entity due to transfers of wealth from debtholders 
to the shareholders resulting from the mishandling of corporate assets. The 
court has often cited either the stripping or the personal use of corporate 
assets by the shareholder as examples of improper treatment.
Stripping the corporation of assets is one shareholder activity which has 
been frequently noted by the courts in their decision to hold the shareholder 
liable for corporate obligations. For instance, the shareholder is stripping 
the corporation of assets and expropriating wealth from the debtholders if 
he borrows money in the corporate name and then proceeds to distribute 
excessive sums from the corporation to himself and/or family members. The 
courts have ruled that corporate profits are to be made available to meet 
obligations to the firm’s debtholders before distributions are made to the 
shareholders. In cases where the shareholder is also a creditor, the value of 
the other creditors’ claims would be reduced if the corporation repays loans 
to the shareholders before repaying loans to other debtholders.
Ceteris paribus, debtholders prefer lower dividends and shareholder 
salaries than do shareholders. While paying excessive dividends and salaries 
is one form of asset stripping, it is not the only form of asset stripping which 
the courts have recognized. The sale of corporate assets to the shareholder 
or another of his businesses at below market value prices could be construed 
as asset stripping. Paying personal obligations out of corporate bank 
acccounts or withdrawing sums in excess of the stated salary are examples 
of more blatsmt forms of asset stripping.
Asset stripping sometimes occurs when the firm is in financial distress 
or has a large claim against it pending and bankruptcy looms. The 
shareholder has in some cases transferred assets from the corporation to 
himself to protect the assets from the claims of third parties. The 
shareholder’s wealth thereby increases at the expense of the debtholders. Prior 
cases have shown that the courts regard asset stripping as evidence of the 
shareholder’s disregard for the corporate entity and will, therefore, hold the 
shareholder liable for the corporation’s debts.
Instead of stripping assets from the corporation, the shareholder may 
try to avoid financial responsibility by transferring assets to the corporation. 
That is, the shareholder may transfer tangible or financial assets from his 
personal name into the name of the corporation to protect himself from the 
claims of a personal creditor from an ex-spouse in a divorce settlement. The 
corporation is not to be used as a shield to protect an individual from 
promises or agreements he has made with third parties, thus the shareholder
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will not avoid personal liability for his obligations by transferring personal 
assets to the corporation.
The use of corporate financial or tangible assets for personal purposes 
is the second activity associated with asset management which is often 
mentioned by the courts in their decision to disregard the corporate entity. 
Using corporate funds to discharge personal obligations or using corporate- 
owned real estate without paying rent are evidence that corporate assets are 
being used for personal purposes. The personal use of corporate assets may 
also take the form of the intermingling of personal and corporate funds or 
the intermingling of corporate funds with those of another business. The 
exclusive use and control of corporate assets by one individual may also 
provide reason for the court to rule that corporate assets are being used for 
personal purposes. Furthermore, it may appear that corporate assets are being 
put to personal use if they are registered in the name of the shareholder rather 
than the name of the corporation.
Evidence of asset stripping or the personal use of corporate assets does 
not have to be accompanied by fraudulent purpose or unjust intent as 
improper asset management has been sufficient in itself to result in the court’s 
disregard of the corporate entity. Shareholders of previously unincorporated 
firms may be prone to take asset management lightly because there is less 
reason to distinguish and maintain a separateness between business and 
personal assets in the unincorporated firm. The shareholder of a small firm 
with one or a relatively few shareholders may be more prone to asset stripping 
or using corporate assets for personal purposes simply because there is likely 
to be little or no disagreement within the firm regarding the use and disposal 
of assets. However, the debtholders, employees, suppliers, and customers also 
have direct or indirect claims on the firm and may seek restitution from the 
court for damages or unfulfilled obligations of the firm resulting from 
improper asset management.
IV. FINANCING OF THE FIRM
To preserve the corporate entity, the firm must be sufficiently capitalized and 
corporate debt or obligations must be separate from those of the shareholder. 
Lenders, realizing the potential for asset stripping or the diversion of funds 
from the corporation to the shareholder, will often require that the 
shareholder co-sign for corporate loans. The courts have ruled that the 
shareholder who guarantees the debt of the corporation either verbally or 
in writing has given up the protection afforded by the corporate entity and 
will be held personally liable. Paying even a single installment of a corporate
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obligation with a personal check from the shareholder is an indication that 
the shareholder is assuming responsibility for the entire obligation.
In small firms a shareholder often provides infusions of capital to 
finance one or more of the corporation’s projects. While it is acceptable for 
the shareholder to provide loans, gross undercapitalization of the firm and 
the resulting dependence on the stockholder to maintain continuing 
operations may signify that the corporation is the alter ego of the shareholder. 
Inadequate or undercapitalization of the corporation has been cited as a 
contributing factor in the court’s decision to disregard the corporate entity.
Whether the firm is undercapitalized is a judgement call by the court. 
In the case of Wheeler vs. Superior Mortgage Co. (1961) 196 Cal App 2d 822, 
17 Cal Rptr 291, the court remarked that “if the capital is illusory or trifling 
compared with the business to be done and the risk of loss, this is a ground 
for denying the separate entity privilege.” In this particular case, the 
corporation was capitalized for only $30. Undercapitalization may even be 
considered fraudulent if it is persistent and endangers the claims of 
debtholders.
Loans between the shareholder and the corporation should be arms- 
length transactions. Loans without accompanying promissory notes or no­
interest loans made to the corporation. The courts may construe this to mean 
that the corporation is the alter ego of the shareholder. To maintain the 
corporate identity, shareholder loans to the corporation must be properly 
recorded as such on the corporation’s books, and a repayment schedule for 
principal and interest decided upon and followed.
The holders of bad debts of the closely held firms are often the parties 
who seek to pierce the corporate veil as a means of gaining access to the 
shareholder’s personal assets. However, even the all-equity firm is not 
immune to attempts by outside parties to break the corporate shield and hold 
the shareholder personally liable. Employees, customers, and the estate of 
the shareholder are among the potential claimants. For instance, an employee 
may sue due to an on-the-job accident, or a customer may sue due to bodily 
injuries or property damage caused by the firm’s product.
Therefore, even the firm with no outstanding debt has reason to take 
precautions to maintain the corporate identity through proper representa­
tion, asset management, and financing.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper discusses the issue of shareholder liability for corporate 
obligations in small business. Although the law allows individuals to 
incorporate their businesses to limit liabilities, the courts have in many cases
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pierced the corporate veil and held shareholders liable for obligations of.the 
corporations. State laws and individual cases differ so it is impossible to 
compile a complete list of what actions should be taken (or not taken) in 
order to preserve the corporate benefit of limited personal liability. Court 
decisions are based on the facts and circumstances of each case. The actions 
noted above are not an all-inclusive “to do” list but are rather intended to 
serve as a guideline based upon the court’s previous decisions to pierce the 
corporate veil. While any one of the actions discussed above may not 
constitute disregard of the corporate entity, any one or more may together 
be construed as such. A direct implication for a small business owner is to 
be aware of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil and to determine if 
certain measures would be appropriate to preserve the corporate benefit of 
limited personal liability.
In practice, it is unlikely that shareholders of a publicly-traded firm 
would bear personal liability for corporate obligations. In most cases, the 
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil would only reach shareholders of 
small, closely-held firms. Piercing the corporate veil is a form of unlimited 
liability. The issue is to decide in which particular cases, and for how much, 
shareholders are held personally liable. This is an interesting area for future 
research in small business.
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